TedTest

From the Ted Talk by Eric X. Li: A tale of two political systems

Unscramble the Blue Letters

Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: shhanagi, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a stroy that explained all I ever neeedd to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in laienr progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, gesus where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this fnail stage of political and social deeenomvlpt. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative diisetlld from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's pupiotlaon lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world cenahgd overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my ytouh, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear poirrgeossn towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the bsiac units to mdoren societies in which atomized individuals are the sveoeigrn units, and all these iualvddniis are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all ceirtnuos and all peoples, with a free marekt to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a misoisn of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by froce, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now — (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the nebmur of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for ssueccs. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (lehtguar) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of prvetoy. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old doeiermcacs put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without vtiong. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rneotiad to a few hundred garms per perosn per month at one pnoit. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's wonrg with this pctuire? Here I am in my hometown, my bsnsueis gwniorg leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are sitntrag companies every day. Middle class is enaxdping in speed and slace unprecedented in human hstoriy. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, cinha is a one-party sttae run by the chiense Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three deifnnig characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is ienlthnery incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the lasegrt country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radaicl land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang zeimn took the ganit political step of opening up patry membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous disyotufnncs. For example, term ltiims. Political leaders used to rtaein their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his pgeoonlrd rule led to doissutars miktseas. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this cailm is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every asecpt of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local lveel to the highest center, are unrecognizable toady. Now such changes are simply not possible without political rfomres of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, pwoer gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, cpourirotn is a big problem, but let's first look at the lrager context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's hihegst ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 membres. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a bncgkuorad of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the pacetngree of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and ceopetmd their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both deevlpeod and dlieevnpog countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: cviil svrceie, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a cmtionumy program. They form separate yet igaettnred cerear paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly eilte ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [socetin mngaear], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moevs from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a conampy. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal cocundt. They conduct public onopiin surveys. Then they ptmoroe the winners. Throughout their careers, these crdeas can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy buearu chief] and ju [bureau chief] leevls. There, they enter high offdiciaolm. By that point, a typical assignment will be to maange a dciitsrt with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of mlilions of dollars in revunee. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the ctreanl Committee. The process takes two to three dcaedes. Does paatnogre play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a mndoireezd version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he eneretd the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. goerge W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack ombaa before running for pniesdert, could not make even a small county manager in China's syestm. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the oaagirtznoin Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of pociiltal legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about cteenocmpy?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was meird in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew resarech polls Chinese pbulic attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who except the fruute to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth aeudttits, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's geoarientn Y are oimtpsitic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the wolrd are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this adueicne how dsnunoiyfcatl it is, from Washington to European ctaiapls. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adoetpd electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm aafrid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in dgenar of linosg legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its mraol legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the daseise. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a vtnruee capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 yeras, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. eocnimoc rfoerm will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is knililg democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think dmcoarecy ctboneiurtd to the rise of the West and the coeairtn of the modern world. It is the usarvniel claim that many Western elites are mnkaig about their political system, the hubris, that is at the haret of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point pcrieelsy. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable iaelds, but the era of their dogmatic urenlvsiasim is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all seoticies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plituarly. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. burno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of mtuenis, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in gearnel in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mesianchm in the Chinese model that allows plepoe to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive auasitorahtirnim." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood dsiirtcts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system — eolteicn, election, election — that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to aegre. One of the features of a domitracec system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of usrents and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western dfotniineis, a so-called civil stoiecy has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and ceorhnet and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural dcefrfneie. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.

Open Cloze

Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: ________, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a _____ that explained all I ever ______ to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in ______ progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, _____ where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this _____ stage of political and social ___________. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative _________ from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's __________ lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world _______ overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my _____, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear ___________ towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the _____ units to ______ societies in which atomized individuals are the _________ units, and all these ___________ are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all _________ and all peoples, with a free ______ to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a _______ of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by _____, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now — (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the ______ of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for _______. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (________) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of _______. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old ___________ put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without ______. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was ________ to a few hundred _____ per ______ per month at one _____. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's _____ with this _______? Here I am in my hometown, my ________ _______ leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are ________ companies every day. Middle class is _________ in speed and _____ unprecedented in human _______. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, _____ is a one-party _____ run by the _______ Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three ________ characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is __________ incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the _______ country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from _______ land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang _____ took the _____ political step of opening up _____ membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous ____________. For example, term ______. Political leaders used to ______ their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his _________ rule led to __________ ________. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this _____ is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every ______ of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local _____ to the highest center, are unrecognizable _____. Now such changes are simply not possible without political _______ of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, _____ gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, __________ is a big problem, but let's first look at the ______ context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's _______ ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 _______. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a __________ of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the __________ of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and ________ their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both _________ and __________ countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: _____ _______, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a _________ program. They form separate yet __________ ______ paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly _____ ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [_______ _______], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not _____ from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a _______. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal _______. They conduct public _______ surveys. Then they _______ the winners. Throughout their careers, these ______ can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy ______ chief] and ju [bureau chief] ______. There, they enter high ___________. By that point, a typical assignment will be to ______ a ________ with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of ________ of dollars in _______. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the _______ Committee. The process takes two to three _______. Does _________ play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a __________ version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he _______ the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. ______ W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack _____ before running for _________, could not make even a small county manager in China's ______. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the ____________ Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of _________ legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about __________?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was _____ in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew ________ polls Chinese ______ attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who ______ the ______ to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth _________, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's __________ Y are __________ about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the _____ are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this ________ how _____________ it is, from Washington to European ________. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have _______ electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm ______ it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in ______ of ______ legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its _____ legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the _______. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a _______ capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 _____, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. ________ ______ will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is _______ democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think _________ ___________ to the rise of the West and the ________ of the modern world. It is the _________ claim that many Western elites are ______ about their political system, the hubris, that is at the _____ of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point _________. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ______, but the era of their dogmatic ____________ is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all _________ must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for _________. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. _____ Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of _______, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in _______ in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the _________ in the Chinese model that allows ______ to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive ________________." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood _________. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system — ________, election, election — that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to _____. One of the features of a __________ system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of _______ and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western ___________, a so-called civil _______ has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and ________ and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural __________. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.

Solution

authoritarianism
force
difference
corruption
wrong
districts
laughter
generation
community
mired
unrests
future
universal
opinion
modern
youth
point
bruno
career
claim
promote
patronage
adopted
limits
competency
modernized
aspect
afraid
prolonged
radical
highest
public
conduct
linear
disease
rationed
larger
organization
world
members
general
reforms
mistakes
danger
district
scale
millions
zemin
killing
research
creation
bureau
countries
election
largest
political
democratic
competed
revenue
decades
contributed
shanghai
capitals
president
plurality
moral
individuals
mission
development
expanding
cadres
today
economic
story
level
china
democracy
minutes
person
market
manage
chinese
dysfunctional
george
mechanism
population
democracies
attitudes
entered
business
grams
people
party
state
precisely
changed
picture
elite
distilled
officialdom
civil
basic
guess
agree
reform
progression
disastrous
number
company
percentage
giant
ideals
years
retain
heart
central
poverty
power
needed
final
background
optimistic
society
integrated
system
venture
history
definitions
moves
developing
manager
voting
starting
dysfunctions
sovereign
service
universalism
coherent
inherently
obama
developed
audience
losing
making
section
defining
success
expect
levels
societies
growing

Original Text

Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now — (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (Laughter) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about competency?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system — election, election, election — that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural difference. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.

Frequently Occurring Word Combinations

ngrams of length 2

collocation	frequency
political reform	4
civil society	4
organization department	3
human societies	2
societies develop	2
live happily	2
political system	2
hold elections	2
western elites	2
million people	2
term limits	2
political reforms	2
central committee	2
public opinion	2
largest economy	2
electoral democracies	2
developing countries	2
national interest	2
chinese model	2

ngrams of length 3

collocation	frequency
human societies develop	2

Important Words

accelerate
accumulate
adapt
adaptability
adopted
afraid
age
aggression
agree
agricultural
alien
alleviation
alternative
alternatives
america
amounted
analysis
analysts
anymore
apparently
applause
approval
areas
arrive
asked
aspect
assignment
assume
assumption
assumptions
ate
atomized
attitudes
audience
authoritarianism
authorities
authority
average
background
backgrounds
bad
barack
base
basic
beginning
believed
belongs
berkeley
bestseller
bets
bias
big
biggest
bit
body
boring
born
bottom
bought
bounds
brand
brave
bruno
bureau
bush
business
businesspeople
buy
cadres
called
cancer
capita
capitalism
capitalist
capitals
care
career
careers
careful
center
central
century
challenges
chance
change
changed
characteristics
charged
chief
children
china
chinese
christian
chu
churchill
city
civil
claim
claims
clarify
class
clerk
client
close
closed
coherent
collection
collectivization
college
combined
coming
committee
communism
communist
community
companies
company
compare
compared
competed
competency
competitive
concentrated
concept
conduct
confucian
consistent
consultation
context
continue
contrary
contrast
contributed
corporations
correct
corruption
counterintuitive
countries
country
county
couple
create
creation
cries
cultural
culture
curbed
cure
current
cycle
danger
data
day
decades
decided
decides
defined
defining
definition
definitions
demands
democracies
democracy
democratic
demonstration
deng
department
deputy
destined
develop
developed
developing
development
difference
dire
direction
disastrous
disease
disillusioned
dismal
dismembered
distilled
district
districts
division
dogmatic
dollars
dominant
doomed
dramatic
draw
driver
dropping
dusk
dysfunctional
dysfunctions
earth
economic
economy
elaborate
elect
elected
election
elections
electoral
elements
eliminated
elite
elites
enacted
engaged
engine
enormous
enter
entered
enterprises
entire
entrepreneurs
environment
environmental
envy
era
eric
essence
european
eventually
evil
evolve
exceptions
exist
expanding
expect
expectancy
expert
explained
exported
express
faces
fact
facts
fail
failed
failing
fair
fall
farmland
fashions
father
features
feudalism
fifty
fight
figures
final
finally
financial
find
firm
fix
follow
food
fool
force
foreign
form
fraction
frank
free
freedom
front
fuchu
fuju
fuke
fukuyama
functions
fundamental
future
garbage
gdps
general
generation
george
giant
give
global
globe
good
govern
governance
governed
government
governments
governor
grads
grams
grand
grandmother
great
grew
groups
growing
guess
gunfire
hands
happened
happening
happily
happy
health
hear
heard
heart
height
hidden
high
highest
hippie
history
hold
home
hometown
house
hubris
human
humanity
hundreds
ideals
illegitimate
ills
incapable
including
income
increasing
increasingly
india
indictment
individuals
industrial
inherently
instituted
institution
institutionally
institutions
integrated
interest
interesting
international
interview
investment
irresponsible
issues
jiang
jinping
job
ju
karl
ke
kid
killing
kind
kinds
lagged
land
language
larger
largest
laudable
laughter
leader
leaders
leading
leap
leaps
led
legitimacy
level
levels
li
life
lifted
limits
line
linear
live
lived
local
long
losing
lot
majority
making
manage
managed
manager
mandatory
manger
mao
market
marx
meat
mechanism
members
membership
memory
mentioned
mentoring
mere
merit
meritocracy
meritocratic
middle
million
millions
minutes
mired
misdiagnose
misimpression
mission
mistakes
mobility
model
modern
modernized
month
months
moral
morally
morning
move
moves
moving
multiple
muslim
national
nationality
needed
needless
neighborhood
notches
number
numbers
obama
officialdom
officials
opening
operates
operationally
opinion
opposites
opposition
optimistic
order
ordinary
organization
organizations
overnight
oversight
panacea
paradise
part
parties
party
path
paths
patronage
peers
people
peoples
percent
percentage
performance
period
perpetual
perpetuate
person
personal
pew
picture
play
plurality
point
policies
politburo
political
politically
polls
pollution
poorest
population
portions
positions
poverty
power
powerful
powerhouse
precisely
predictions
premier
president
pretend
previous
primitive
princelings
priori
private
privatization
privilege
problem
problems
process
produce
program
progress
progression
prolonged
promote
promoted
prospectus
prosperity
protests
provincial
public
put
putting
pyramid
question
questions
radical
range
ranked
ranking
ranks
rate
rational
rationed
recognize
recruit
reform
reforms
regimes
regret
religion
remains
remember
research
resource
responsive
rest
result
retain
retirement
revenue
reviews
revolution
rhetorical
rich
rigid
rise
role
rotating
rule
rules
ruling
run
running
runs
safety
salvation
satisfaction
scale
scientist
scientists
section
selling
senior
separate
service
shanghai
sharing
show
shown
significance
simply
single
singular
slave
small
smaller
social
socialism
societies
society
son
sooner
sound
source
sovereign
space
speed
spend
spreading
stage
stamps
standard
start
started
starting
state
statement
stay
step
stop
stopped
story
strife
struggle
studied
subordinates
success
successful
successor
suffering
suffrage
suggest
superiors
superpowerdom
supplant
support
surpass
survey
surveys
system
systems
takes
talk
taught
ted
telling
tells
tens
term
terrible
texas
theories
thinking
thought
thousands
time
times
tirelessly
today
told
top
total
tracks
traditional
transparency
trap
trillion
triumph
trotted
true
truth
typical
tyranny
undermines
unelected
unified
unimaginable
units
universal
universalism
universality
university
unprecedented
unrecognizable
unrests
unsettling
unstuck
unusual
upward
vast
venture
version
vet
vibrant
video
village
vote
voted
voting
wars
washington
wealth
week
west
western
westerners
whopping
wide
wider
widespread
winners
winston
words
worked
world
worse
worst
wrenching
wrong
xi
year
years
youth
zemin